

# Counterfeit Electronics Optical Microscopy


## Navid Asadi

#### Physical Inspection and AttacKs on ElectronicS (PHIKS)



### **Microscopy and FA Tools**






- Imaging and debugging tools are developed for fault analysis.
- Fast advancement in FIB/SEM imaging
- Advancement in photonic emission microscopy, LVS, IR analysis
- Development in micro and nano probing, EBIC, EBAC






### **Optical Inspection**





### **Optical Inspection**






Different marking location



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#### **Back Surface**






Different marking location

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
### **Optical Inspection Part 28**





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## **Taxonomy of Defects**



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# **Scratch Detection**


#### **Prior work**


Thresholding, Edge detection, vertical/horizontal line detection, etc.

#### Hough Transform


- Each white pixel in a binary image "votes" for a family of lines in an accumulator matrix
- Given a set of angles  $\theta = \{-89^\circ, ..., 90^\circ\}$  on some interval and a pixel  $(x_0, y_0)$ :
  - Can define the family of lines that pass through  $(x_0, y_0)$  as:
  - $r = x_0 \cos\theta + y_0 \sin\theta$ 
    - Each pair  $(r, \Theta)$  in the accumulator matrix is incremented by 1

Image





# PSD813F1-90 9945GAZ









# **Hough Transform**



#### Accumulator











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### Preprocessing: Confounding Element Removal







- Problem: Text, Logos, and orientation markers can create false Hough Line peaks
- Here, we assume text has already been removed





### Preprocessing: Confounding Element Removal








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# **Binary Image Formation**




 Low Pass filter is applied to highlight scratches, blend together pixels into more uniform lines


#### **Binary Threshold:**

For all pixels (*i*,*j*) in Filtered Image :  $B(i,j) = \{ \begin{array}{l} 1 & if \ F(i,j) > \mu + 3\sigma \\ 0 & Otherwise \end{array} \}$ 

Original Image



**Resulting Binary Image** 



### Results





Average(s)	Standard	1	2	3	4
Detected Scratches	0	4	1	6	3
False Positives	0	0	0	2	1
True Scratches	0	4	8	6	4
Accuracy	100.00	100.00	0.13	0.75	0.60

 $Accuracy = \frac{Detected \ Scratches}{True \ Scratches + False \ Positives}$ 



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# **Defect Detection Automation**



- 1. Image processing and filtering
  - a) Image filtering, with a modified Hough transform to detect circles
  - b) Sobel filter and canny edge detection algorithm to detect the scratches

# Sudden change in the gradient will represent an edge or scratch.


- 2. Machine Learning
  - a) Similar to human brain structure
  - b) Information is stored in interconnections between layers
  - c) Traditional and modern ML

#### **Counterfeit IC with scratch defect**



original image

after image processing






### **Artificial Neural Network**



### **ANN Principles:**

- Information is stored in the interconnections between neurons
- Each neuron in input layer is connected to all neurons in hidden layer.
- Weighted matrix decides the input for each neuron in hidden layer
- Output of a neuron is calculated based on an appropriate activation function (tanh, step function, etc.)
- During training the expected output is compared with the output obtained.

Flowchart for the counterfeit IC detection using neural network










- VIEW and EXPORT images and statistical information related to counterfeit defects
- UPLOAD images of defects found by physical inspection of counterfeit ICs
- DEVELOP automated counterfeit IC detection techniques
- LEARN more about the defects found in counterfeit ICs and counterfeit IC detection







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Learn more about counterfeit defects






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


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### **Learn- Defect Taxonomy**





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### **Learn- Defect Definitions**




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View - Add -	Edit - Instructions Taxonomy Contact us Resources Log In
	Defects
Mecha	Environmental
Lead/Bails/Column  ML1: Dents/ Damaged/ Bent  ML2: Reworked	Package     Bond Wires     Die     Lead/Balls/ Column     Package       MP1: Sanding/     MB1: Missing Wires     MD1: Missing Die     NL1: Contamination     NP1: Abnormal       MP1: Sanding/     MB1: Missing Wires     MD1: Missing Die     NL1: Contamination     NP1: Abnormal       NP2: Contamination     NP2: Contamination     NP2: Contamination
ML3 Incorrect     Dimensions     ML4: Wrong	MP1: Sanding/ Gringing Marks
Materials ML5: Color Variations ML6: Tooling Marks ML7: Misaligned/ missing Balts/ Columns	If the package exhibits any sanding or grinding marks externally, it has likely been remarked. Generally, counterfeiters use sand blasting processes to remove markings from the package. This process generally results in a distinct visual signature being present on the package.
ML9: Distorted/ Non-Uniform Balls/ Columns ML9: Lead Reattachment	MP8: Dirty Cavities  MP9: Incorrect Dimensions/ Weight  MP10: Finer Gross Leak (Hermatic)

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#### **View a Product Report**





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### **View a Defect Report**





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### View a Defect Report



View - Add - Edit -	Instructions	Taxonomy Conta	ct us Resources	Log In		
		F-K0522-FQA-44N30	Unknown Manufa	cturer	1	20%
Defect Pener	t for (	CA91L860B-50CE	Tundra Semicond	uctor Corporation	5	100%
Defect Report		AD7512DIJ	Unknown Manufa	turer	5	100%
Defect Taxonomy	-///					
Primary Classificiation Secondary Classification Tertiary Classification						« 1 »
Product Types With Sanding/Grit	nding Marks Manufa	Defect Name	Pr	oportion of Component	s with Sanding/Grinding M	arks
XC400E-PC84CKM0221	Unknov	Package Mold Variati	ions 59	.09%		
A0400E-P0840NM0221	UNKNOW	Reworked	50	0/		
	512		50	70		
IDT7025S45PF		Tooling Marks	50	%		
i960	Intel	Markings	50	%		
i960 FB23AB (S2)	Intel Unknov	Markings Improper Textures	50 45 40	% .45% .91%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30	Intel Unknov Unknov	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings	50 45 40 5 31	% .45% .91% .82%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30 CA91L860B-50CE	Intel Unknov Unknov Tundra	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings Dents, Damages, or	50 45 40 5 31 Bent 27	% .45% .91% .82% .27%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30	Intel Unknov Unknov	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings Dents, Damages, or I Misaligned/Missing B	50 45 40 5 31 Bent 27 alls/Columns 22	% 45% 91% 82% 27% 73%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30 CA91L860B-50CE	Intel Unknov Unknov Tundra	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings Dents, Damages, or I Misaligned/Missing B Ghost Markings	50 45 40 5 31 Bent 27 alls/Columns 22 22	% .45% .91% .82% .27% .73% .73%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30 CA91L860B-50CE	Intel Unknov Unknov Tundra	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings Dents, Damages, or I Misaligned/Missing B Ghost Markings Color Variations/Fade	50 45 40 5 31 Bent 27 alls/Columns 22 22 22 22	% 45% 91% 82% 27% 73%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30 CA91L860B-50CE	Intel Unknov Unknov Tundra	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings Dents, Damages, or I Misaligned/Missing B Ghost Markings	50 45 40 5 31 Bent 27 alls/Columns 22 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22 2	% .45% .91% .82% .27% .73% .73% .73%		
i960 FB23AB (S2) F-K0522-FQA-44N30 CA91L860B-50CE	Intel Unknov Unknov Tundra Unknov	Markings Improper Textures Extraneous Markings Dents, Damages, or I Misaligned/Missing B Ghost Markings Color Variations/Fade Fine/Gross Leak (He	50 45 40 31 Bent 27 alls/Columns 22 22 23 22 24 22 22 25 22 22 22 22 22 23 22 22 23 22 22 23 22 22	% .45% .91% .82% .27% .73% .73% .73% .73%		

### **View a Sample Report**



Contract of the second	View - Add - Edit - In:	structions	Taxonomy	Contact us F	Resources Log In
	Component #78:				
	Product Type:			i960	
	Product Specification:			Not available	
	Product Image:			Not available	
ani.	Sample Group:			Initial	
5 5	ID Within Sample:			1	
	Defect Name	Image	Primary Class	Secondary Class	Tertiary Class
	Reworked	View	Mechanical	Lead/Balls/Column	s N/A
	Tooling Marks	View	Mechanical	Lead/Balls/Column:	s N/A
	Misaligned/Missing Balls/Columns	View	Mechanical	Lead/Balls/Column	s N/A
	Package Mold Variations	View	Mechanical	Package	N/A
· · · / ,			Mechanical	Package	N/A

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### **View a Sample Defect Image**





### **Uploading a New Sample Group**



To upload using an Excel File, first download the form below. Each row of the form represents one defect of one component of the sample. For each row:

- 1. Enter the sample ID number of the component
- 2. Select the desired defect
- 3. If applicable, create a hyperlink to the corresponding image of the defect.

Do not skip rows when entering data. When finished, create a zip archive containing the images, and the Excel file, taking care to preserve the file system structure between the images and the Excel file. Maximum file Upload is 100MB.

#### See example here

Download Excel Form

#### Upload the Zip Archive Below:


Click Here or Drag Files to Upload

Submit Zip file



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### **Uploading a New Sample Group**



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# Readings



- IDEA-STD-1010-B
- Counterfeit-ic.org
- Book chapter: Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: Detection, Avoidance, and the Challenges Ahead
- ISTFA paper: A Database for Counterfeit Electronics and Automatic Defect Detection Based on Image processing and Machine Learning

