

Synchronization of coupled oscillators is a game

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GERAD seminar, April 20, 2010

Acknowledgment: AFOSR, NSF



Huibing Yin



Sean P. Meyn



Uday V. Shanbhag

H. Yin, P. G. Mehta, S. P. Meyn and U. V. Shanbhag, "Synchronization of coupled oscillators is a game," ACC 2010

Acknowledgement

Thanks to Minyi Huang, Roland P. Malhame, and Peter Caines



Minyi Huang



Roland P. Malhame



Peter Caines

M. Huang, P. Caines, and R. Malhame, "Large-population cost-coupled LQG problems with nonuniform agents: Individual-mass behavior and decentralized ε -nash equilibria," IEEE TAC, 2007

Millennium bridge


[Video of London Millennium bridge from youtube](#)

[11] S. H. Strogatz et al., Nature, 2005

Classical Kuramoto model

$$d\theta_i(t) = \left(\omega_i + \frac{\kappa}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \sin(\theta_j(t) - \theta_i(t)) \right) dt + \sigma d\xi_i(t), \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$

- ω_i taken from distribution $g(\omega)$ over $[1 - \gamma, 1 + \gamma]$
 γ — measures the heterogeneity of the population
- κ — measures the strength of coupling





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
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
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
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
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Movies of incoherence and synchrony solution



Incoherence




Synchrony

Problem statement

- Dynamics of i^{th} oscillator

$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i(t)) dt + \sigma d\xi_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad t \geq 0$$

- $u_i(t)$ — control



- i^{th} oscillator seeks to minimize

$$\eta_i(u_i; u_{-i}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E} \left[\underbrace{c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i})}_{\text{cost of anarchy}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} R u_i^2}_{\text{cost of control}} \right] ds$$

- $\theta_{-i} = (\theta_j)_{j \neq i}$
- R — control penalty
- $c(\cdot)$ — cost function


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
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


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1 Motivation

- Why a game?
- Why Oscillators?

2 Problems and results

- Problem statement
- Main results

3 Derivation of model

- Overview
- Derivation steps
- PDE model

4 Analysis of phase transition

- Incoherence solution
- Bifurcation analysis
- Numerics

5 Learning

- Q-function approximation
- Steepest descent algorithm

Quiz

In the video you just watched, why were the individuals walking strangely?

- A. To show respect to the Queen.
- B. Anarchists in the crowd were trying to destabilize the bridge.
- C. They were stepping to the beat of the soundtrack "Walk Like an Egyptian."
- D. The individuals were trying to maintain their balance.

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“Rational irrationality”

“—behavior that, on the individual level, is perfectly reasonable but that, when aggregated in the marketplace, produces calamity.”

- Examples

- Millennium bridge
- Financial market

John Cassidy, “Rational Irrationality: The real reason that capitalism is so crash-prone,” The New Yorker, 2009

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
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Hodgkin-Huxley type Neuron model

$$C \frac{dV}{dt} = -g_T \cdot m_{\infty}^2(V) \cdot \textcolor{red}{h} \cdot (V - E_T) \\ - g_h \cdot \textcolor{red}{r} \cdot (V - E_h) - \dots$$

$$\frac{dh}{dt} = \frac{h_{\infty}(V) - h}{\tau_h(V)}$$

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
[4] J. Guckenheimer, J. Math. Biol., 1975; [2] J. Moehlis et al., Neural Computation, 2004

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

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


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

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Normal form reduction $\rightarrow$



$$\dot{\theta}_i = \omega_i + u_i \cdot \Phi(\theta_i)$$


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Finite oscillator model

- Dynamics of i^{th} oscillator

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- $u_i(t)$ — control




- i^{th} oscillator seeks to minimize

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

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1. Synchronization is a solution of game




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Yin et al., ACC 2010

Strogatz et al., J. Stat. Phys., 1992


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

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Strogatz et al., J. Stat. Phys., 1992

2. Kuramoto control is approximately optimal



Learning algorithm:


$$\frac{dA_i}{dt} = -\epsilon \dots$$

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Overview of model derivation

$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i(t)) dt + \sigma d\xi_i$$

$$\eta_i(u_i; u_{-i}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E}[\bar{c}(\theta_i, t) + \frac{1}{2} R u_i^2] ds$$



1 Mean-field approximation

- Assumption:

$$c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}(t)) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta_i, \theta_j) \xrightarrow{N \rightarrow \infty} \bar{c}(\theta, t)$$

2 Optimal control of single oscillator

- Decentralized control structure

[5] M. Huang, P. Caines, and R. Malhame, IEEE TAC, 2007 [HCM]

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Single oscillator with given cost

- Dynamics of the oscillator

$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i(t)) dt + \sigma d\xi_i, \quad t \geq 0$$

- The cost function is assumed known

$$\eta_i(u_i; \bar{c}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E} \left[\boxed{c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i})} + \frac{1}{2} R u_i^2(s) \right] ds$$

$\uparrow$
 $\bar{c}(\theta_i(s), s)$

- HJB equation:

$$\partial_t h_i + \omega_i \partial_\theta h_i = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h_i)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta_i^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h_i$$

- Optimal control law: $u_i^*(t) = \varphi_i(\theta, t) = -\frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta h_i(\theta, t)$

[1] D. P. Bertsekas (1995); [9] S. P. Meyn, IEEE TAC, 1997


Single oscillator with optimal control

- Dynamics of the oscillator

$$d\theta_i(t) = \left(\omega_i - \frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} h_i(\theta_i, t) \right) dt + \sigma d\xi_i(t)$$

- Fokker-Planck equation for pdf $p(\theta, t, \omega_i)$

$$\text{FPK: } \partial_t p + \omega_i \partial_{\theta} p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} [p(\partial_{\theta} h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p$$



Mean-field Approximation

- HJB equation for population


$$\partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta(\omega) - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \quad \boxed{h(\theta, t, \omega)}$$

- Population density

$$\partial_t p + \omega \partial_\theta p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta [p(\partial_\theta h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p \quad \boxed{p(\theta, t, \omega)}$$

- Enforce cost consistency

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{c}(\theta, t) &= \int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) p(\vartheta, t, \omega) g(\omega) d\vartheta d\omega \\ &\approx \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) \end{aligned}$$



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Summary

$$\text{HJB: } \partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \Rightarrow h(\theta, t, \omega)$$

$$\text{FPK: } \partial_t p + \omega \partial_\theta p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta [p(\partial_\theta h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p \Rightarrow p(\theta, t, \omega)$$

$$\text{Mean-field approx.: } \bar{c}(\vartheta, t) = \int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} c^\bullet(\vartheta, \theta) p(\theta, t, \omega) g(\omega) d\theta d\omega$$

- 1 Bellman's optimality principle (H,J,B)
- 2 Propagation of chaos (F,P,K, McKean, Vlasov, ...)
- 3 Mean-field approximation (Boltzmann, Kac, ...)
- 4 Connection to Nash game (Weintraub, HCM, Altman, ...)

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1. Solution of PDE gives ε -Nash equilibrium

- Optimal control law

$$u_i^o = -\frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} h(\theta(t), t, \omega) \Big|_{\omega=\omega_i}$$

- ε -Nash property (as $N \rightarrow \infty$)

$$\eta_i(u_i^o; u_{-i}^o) \leq \eta_i(u_i; u_{-i}^o) + O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\right), \quad i = 1, \dots, N.$$

So, we look for solutions of PDEs.

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
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So, we look for solutions of PDEs.

2. Incoherence solution (PDE)

- Incoherence solution

$$h(\theta, t, \omega) = h_0(\theta) := 0 \quad p(\theta, t, \omega) = p_0(\theta) := \frac{1}{2\pi}$$



$$\boxed{h(\theta, t, \omega) = 0} \Rightarrow \quad \underline{\partial_t h} + \omega \underline{\partial_\theta h} = \frac{1}{2R} (\underline{\partial_\theta h})^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \underline{\partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h}$$

$$\partial_t p + \omega \partial_\theta p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta [p(\partial_\theta h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p$$

$$\bar{c}(\theta, t) = \int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) p(\vartheta, t, \omega) g(\omega) d\vartheta d\omega$$

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

$$h(\theta, t, \omega) = 0 \Rightarrow \underline{\partial_t h} + \omega \underline{\partial_\theta h} = \frac{1}{2R} (\underline{\partial_\theta h})^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \underline{\partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h}$$

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- Assume $c^\bullet(\vartheta, \theta) = c^\bullet(\vartheta - \theta) = \frac{1}{2} \sin^2 \left(\frac{\vartheta - \theta}{2} \right)$



- Incoherence solution


$$h(\theta, t, \omega) = h_0(\theta) := 0 \quad p(\theta, t, \omega) = p_0(\theta) := \frac{1}{2\pi}$$

- Optimal control $u = -\frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta h = 0$

- Average cost

$$\bar{c}(\theta, t) = \int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} \frac{1}{2} \sin^2 \left(\frac{\theta - \vartheta}{2} \right) \frac{1}{2\pi} g(\omega) d\vartheta d\omega$$

$$\eta^*(\omega) = \bar{c}(\theta, t) = \frac{1}{4} =: \eta_0 \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega$$




No cost of control


2. Incoherence solution (Finite population)

- Closed-loop dynamics $d\theta_i = (\omega_i + \underbrace{u_i}_{=0}) dt + \sigma d\xi_i(t)$
- Average cost

$$\begin{aligned}
 \eta_i &= \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E} \left[c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) + \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} R u_i^2}_{=0} \right] dt \\
 &= \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{2} \sin^2 \left(\frac{\theta_i(t) - \theta_j(t)}{2} \right) \right] dt \\
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$$p(\theta, t, \omega) = \frac{1}{2\pi}$$




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
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

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
3. Synchronization is a solution of game





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
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

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
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 - Steepest descent algorithm


Overview of the steps

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Linearization and spectra

- Linearized PDE (about incoherence solution)

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} \tilde{z}(\theta, t, \omega) = \begin{pmatrix} -\omega \partial_{\theta} \tilde{h} - \bar{c} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 \tilde{h} \\ -\omega \partial_{\theta} \tilde{p} + \frac{1}{2\pi R} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 \tilde{h} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 \tilde{p} \end{pmatrix} =: \mathcal{L}_R \tilde{z}(\theta, t, \omega)$$

- Spectrum of the linear operator

- Continuous spectrum $\{S^{(k)}\}_{k=-\infty}^{+\infty}$

$$S^{(k)} := \left\{ \lambda \in \mathbb{C} \mid \lambda = \pm \frac{\sigma^2}{2} k^2 - k\omega i \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega \right\}$$

- Discrete spectrum

Characteristic eqn: $\frac{1}{8R} \int_{\Omega} \frac{g(\omega)}{(\lambda - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \omega i)(\lambda + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} + \omega i)} d\omega + 1 = 0.$

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
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
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Bifurcation diagram (Hamiltonian Hopf)


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► Stability proof

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



[3] Dellnitz et al., Int. Series Num. Math., 1992

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

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Numerical solution of PDEs

Incoherence; $R = 60$



$$p(\theta, t, \omega) = \frac{1}{2\pi}$$





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

$$p(\theta, t, \omega) = \frac{1}{2\pi}$$



Synchrony; $R = 10$





Bifurcation diagram



$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i) dt + \sigma d\xi_i$$

$$\eta_i(u_i; u_{-i}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E}[c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) + \frac{1}{2} R u_i^2] ds$$



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


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

Bifurcation diagram with another cost

$$c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) = 0.25(1 - \cos(\theta - \vartheta))$$





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

Bifurcation diagram with another cost

$$c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) = 0.25(1 - \cos(\theta - \vartheta)) \quad c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) = 1 - \cos(\theta - \vartheta) - \cos 3(\theta - \vartheta)$$



Bifurcation diagram with another cost

$$c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) = 0.25(1 - \cos(\theta - \vartheta)) \quad c^\bullet(\theta, \vartheta) = 1 - \cos(\theta - \vartheta) - \cos 3(\theta - \vartheta)$$



1

Motivation

- Why a game?
- Why Oscillators?

2

Problems and results

- Problem statement
- Main results

3

Derivation of model

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- Derivation steps
- PDE model

4

Analysis of phase transition

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
5

Learning

- Q-function approximation
- Steepest descent algorithm

Comparison to Kuramoto law

$$\text{Control law } u = \varphi(\theta, t, \omega) = -\frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} h(\theta, t, \omega)$$




Equivalent control law in Kuramoto oscillator

$$u_i^{(\text{Kur})} = \frac{\kappa}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \sin(\theta_j(t) - \theta_i) \stackrel{N \rightarrow \infty}{\approx} \kappa_0 \sin(\vartheta_0 + t - \theta_i)$$

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- **Optimality equation**
$$\min_{u_i} \underbrace{c(\theta; \theta_{-i}(t)) + \frac{1}{2}Ru_i^2 + \mathcal{D}_{u_i}h_i(\theta, t)}_{=: H_i(\theta, u_i; \theta_{-i}(t))} = \eta_i^*$$

- **Optimal control law**

$$u_i^* = -\frac{1}{R}\partial_{\theta}h_i(\theta, t)$$

- Kuramoto law**

$$u_i^{(\text{Kur})} = -\frac{\kappa}{N}\sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta_i - \theta_j(t))$$

- **Parameterization:**

$$H_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)}(\theta, u_i; \theta_{-i}(t)) = c(\theta; \theta_{-i}(t)) + \frac{1}{2}Ru_i^2 + (\omega_i - 1 + u_i)A_i S^{(\phi_i)} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}A_i C^{(\phi_i)}$$

where

$$S^{(\phi)}(\theta, \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta - \theta_j - \phi), \quad C^{(\phi)}(\theta, \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{j \neq i} \cos(\theta - \theta_j - \phi)$$

- **Approx. optimal control:**

$$u_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)} = \underset{u_i}{\operatorname{argmin}} \{H_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)}(\theta, u_i; \theta_{-i}(t))\} = -\frac{A_i}{R}S^{(\phi_i)}(\theta, \theta_{-i})$$

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- Bellman error:

Pointwise: $\mathcal{L}^{(A_i, \phi_i)}(\theta, t) = \min_{u_i} \{H_i^{(A_i, \phi_i)}\} - \eta_i^{(A_i^*, \phi_i^*)}$

- Simple gradient descent algorithm

$$\tilde{e}(A_i, \phi_i) = \sum_{k=1}^2 |\langle \mathcal{L}^{(A_i, \phi_i)}, \tilde{\phi}_k(\theta) \rangle|^2$$

$$\frac{dA_i}{dt} = -\varepsilon \frac{d\tilde{e}(A_i, \phi_i)}{dA_i}, \quad \frac{d\phi_i}{dt} = -\varepsilon \frac{d\tilde{e}(A_i, \phi_i)}{d\phi_i} \quad (*)$$

Theorem (Convergence)

Assume population is in synchrony. The i^{th} oscillator updates according to (). Then*

$$A_i(t) \rightarrow A^* = \frac{1}{2\sigma^2}$$

- The pointwise Bellman error $\mathcal{L}^{(A_i, 0)}(\theta, t) = \varepsilon(R) \cos 2(\theta - t)$
 where $\varepsilon(R) = \frac{1}{16R\sigma^4}$



Phase transition

Suppose all oscillators use approx. optimal control law:

$$u_i = -\frac{A^*}{R} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta_i - \theta_j(t))$$

then the phase transition boundary is




$$R_c(\gamma) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2\sigma^4} & \text{if } \gamma = 0 \\ \frac{1}{4\sigma^2\gamma} \tan^{-1}\left(\frac{2\gamma}{\sigma^2}\right) & \text{if } \gamma > 0 \end{cases}$$




Comparison of control laws

$$\text{From PDE: } u_i = \varphi(\theta, t, \omega) \Big|_{\omega=\omega_i} = -\frac{1}{R} \partial_{\theta} h(\theta, t, \omega) \Big|_{\omega=\omega_i}$$

$$\text{From learning: } u_i = -\frac{A^*}{R} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} \sin(\theta_i - \theta_j(t) - \phi_i)$$



Comparison of average cost



Thank you!

Website: <http://www.mechse.illinois.edu/research/mehtapg>



Huibing Yin



Sean P. Meyn



Uday V. Shanbhag

Part I

Appendix

6

Appendix

- Game-theoretic results (ϵ -Nash)
- Stability
- Numerics
- Linearization/Spectra
- Modeling
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Bibliography

Infinit population limit

- Recall the PDE model

$$\partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h$$

$$\partial_t p + \omega \partial_\theta p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta [p(\partial_\theta h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p$$

$$\bar{c}(\vartheta, t) = \int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} c^\bullet(\vartheta, \theta) p(\theta, t, \omega) g(\omega) d\theta d\omega$$

- Solution $h(\theta, t, \omega)$
- Control $u_i^o(t) := -\frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta h(\theta, t, \omega)|_{\omega=\omega_i}$
- By construction:

$$\eta_i(u_i^o; \bar{c}) \leq \eta_i(u_i; \bar{c})$$

Finite population

- Finite population cost

$$\bar{c}_i^{(N)}(\vartheta, t) := \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta_j(t); \theta_{-i}^o(t) | \theta_i(t) = \vartheta) \right]$$

$\theta_{-i}^o = (\theta_1^o, \dots, \theta_{i-1}^o, \theta_{i+1}^o, \dots, \theta_N^o)$ with $\theta_i^o(t)$ obtained from dynamics with control $u_i = u_i^o(t)$

- Lemma 1: for each $i = 1, \dots, N$

$$\max_{\vartheta \in [0, 2\pi]} \left[\limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T |\bar{c}(\vartheta, s) - \bar{c}_i^{(N)}(\vartheta, s)| \, ds \right] = O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\right)$$

ε -Nash equilibrium

Theorem

The control $\{u_i^o(t) = -\frac{1}{R}\partial_{\theta}h(\theta(t), t, \omega)|_{\omega=\omega_i}\}_{i=1}^N$ is an ε -Nash equilibrium with respect to the finite population cost

$$\eta_i^{(POP)}(u_i; u_{-i}^o) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \bar{c}_i^{(N)} + \frac{1}{2} R u_i^2 ds;$$

i.e., for any adapted control u_i ,

$$\eta_i^{(POP)}(u_i^o; u_{-i}^o) \leq \eta_i^{(POP)}(u_i; u_{-i}^o) + O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\right), \quad i = 1, \dots, N.$$

$$\bar{c}_i^{(N)}(\vartheta, t) := \mathbb{E}[c(\theta_i(t); \theta_{-i}^o(t)) | \theta_i(t) = \vartheta]$$

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Appendix

- Game-theoretic results (ε -Nash)

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Bibliography

Stability proof


$$\frac{dx}{dt} = -ax + by, \quad a > 0 \quad \Leftarrow \text{FPK eqn}$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt} = cx + ay, \quad bc < 0 \quad \Leftarrow \text{HJB eqn}$$

with boundary conditions $x(0) = x_0$ and $y(\infty) = 0$

$$x(t) = e^{at}x_0 + b \int_0^t e^{-a(t-\tau)}y(\tau) d\tau,$$

$$y(t) = -c \int_t^\infty e^{a(t-\tau)}x(\tau) d\tau.$$



- For $x_0 = 0$, equilibrium solution $x(t) \equiv 0$, $y(t) \equiv 0$
- Characteristic equation $\sigma^2 = a^2 + bc$.
- Stable in the sense that

The equilibrium solution is *asymptotically stable* if for any initial perturbation x_0 , the solution $x(t) \rightarrow 0$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

[Return to spectrum](#)

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
$$\text{HJB: } \partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \Rightarrow h(\theta, t, \omega)$$

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$$V(\theta, t, \omega) = h(\theta, T - s, \omega)$$

Iterative algorithm



Algorithm for solving PDEs


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
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$$V(\theta, t, \omega) = h(\theta, T-s, \omega)$$



Iterative algorithm






Numerical solution of PDEs

Incoherence; $R = 60$

$$p(\theta, t, \omega) = \frac{1}{2\pi}$$



$p(\theta, t, \omega)$ at given position θ





Iter = 1

Iter=4


Iter=19

Numerical solution of PDEs


Synchrony; $R = 10$




$p(\theta, t, \omega)$ at given position θ



Iter = 1



Iter=4



Iter=19

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Linearization

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial t} \tilde{z}(\theta, t, \omega) = \begin{pmatrix} -\omega \partial_{\theta} \tilde{h} - \bar{c} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 \tilde{h} \\ -\omega \partial_{\theta} \tilde{p} + \frac{1}{2\pi R} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 \tilde{h} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 \tilde{p} \end{pmatrix}$$

- Eigenvector problem $\lambda Z = \mathcal{L}_R Z$
- Fourier series expansion with respect to θ

$$H = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{+\infty} H_k(\omega) e^{ik\theta}, \quad P = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{+\infty} P_k(\omega) e^{ik\theta}$$

- Decomposition of the linear operator $\mathcal{L}_R = \oplus_k \mathcal{L}_R^{(k)}$

Linearization (cont.)

- Individual operator

$$\mathcal{L}_R^{(1)} := \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\sigma^2}{2} - \omega i & \frac{\pi}{4} \int_{\Omega} g(\omega) d\omega \\ -\frac{1}{2\pi R} & -\frac{\sigma^2}{2} - \omega i \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_R^{(k)} := \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\sigma^2}{2} k^2 - k\omega i & 0 \\ -\frac{k^2}{2\pi R} & -\frac{\sigma^2}{2} k^2 - k\omega i \end{pmatrix}, \quad k \geq 2$$

$$\mathcal{L}_R^{(-k)} = \overline{\mathcal{L}_R^{(k)}}$$

- Continuous spectrum $\{S^{(k)}\}_{k=-\infty}^{+\infty}$

$$S^{(k)} := \left\{ \lambda \in \mathbb{C} \mid \lambda = \pm \frac{\sigma^2}{2} k^2 - k\omega i \text{ for all } \omega \in \Omega \right\}$$

- Discrete spectrum coincides with the discrete spectrum of $\mathcal{L}_R^{(\pm 1)}$

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
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
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
Neuron



Neuron



Equivalent circuits





Finite oscillator model

- Dynamics of i^{th} oscillator [10]:

$$d\theta_i = (\omega_i + u_i(t))dt + \sigma d\xi_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad t \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

- θ_i — phase of the oscillator
- $\{\xi_i\}$ — mutually independent Wiener processes
- ω_i — constant and chosen independently according to a fixed distribution with density g
- $u_i(t)$ — control




Finite oscillator model (cont.)

- i^{th} oscillator seeks to minimize

$$\eta_i^{(\text{POP})}(u_i; u_{-i}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E} \left[\underbrace{c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i})}_{\text{cost of anarchy}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} R u_i^2}_{\text{cost of control}} \right] ds$$

- $\theta_{-i} = (\theta_j)_{j \neq i}$
- R — control penalty
- $c(\cdot)$ — cost function

$$c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta_i, \theta_j), \quad c^\bullet \geq 0$$



- $\{u_i^*\}_{i=1}^N$ Nash equilibrium if

$$u_i^* \text{ minimizes } \eta_i^{(\text{POP})}(u_i; u_{-i}^*), \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, N.$$

Intuition

- i^{th} oscillator seeks to minimize



$$\eta_i^{(\text{POP})}(u_i; u_{-i}) = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T \mathbb{E} \left[\underbrace{c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i})}_{\text{cost of anarchy}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} R u_i^2}_{\text{cost of control}} \right] ds$$

- Trade-off between reducing the two costs

- Cost associated with $\theta_i \neq \theta_j$: $c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^\bullet(\theta_i - \theta_j)$

- Cost associated with control: $\frac{1}{2} R u_i^2$

- Qualitative macro-behavior change when R varies



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- HJB equation $\Rightarrow$ obtain optimal control

$$\partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \quad (2)$$

- $h(\theta, t, \omega)$ — relative value function
- $\eta^*(\omega)$ — average optimal cost

- Optimal feed-back control law $\varphi(\theta, t, \omega) := -\frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta h(\theta, t, \omega)$

PDE model (as $N \rightarrow \infty$)

- HJB equation $\Rightarrow$ **obtain optimal control**

$$\partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \quad (2)$$

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- Optimal feed-back control law $\varphi(\theta, t, \omega) := -\frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta h(\theta, t, \omega)$

- Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation

$$d\theta_i(t) = (\omega_i + u_i(t)) dt + \sigma d\xi_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, N$$

replaced by: $\partial_t p + \partial_\theta \left((\omega + \varphi) p \right) = \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p$

- $p(\theta, t, \omega)$ — probability density function

[10] Strogatz et al., Journal of Statistical Physics, 1991

PDE model (as $N \rightarrow \infty$)

- HJB equation $\Rightarrow$ **obtain optimal control**

$$\partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \quad (2)$$


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- $h(\theta, t, \omega)$ — relative value function
- $\eta^*(\omega)$ — average optimal cost
- Optimal feed-back control law $\varphi(\theta, t, \omega) := -\frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta h(\theta, t, \omega)$

- FPK equation $\Rightarrow$ evolution of population phase angles

$$\partial_t p + \omega \partial_\theta p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta [p(\partial_\theta h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p \quad (3)$$

PDE model (as $N \rightarrow \infty$)

- HJB equation $\Rightarrow$ obtain optimal control

$$\partial_t h + \omega \partial_\theta h = \frac{1}{2R} (\partial_\theta h)^2 - \bar{c}(\theta, t) + \eta^* - \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 h \quad (2)$$

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- FPK equation $\Rightarrow$ evolution of population phase angles

$$\partial_t p + \omega \partial_\theta p = \frac{1}{R} \partial_\theta [p(\partial_\theta h)] + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \partial_{\theta\theta}^2 p \quad \Rightarrow \quad (3)$$

Generate cost: $\int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} c^\bullet(\vartheta, \theta) p(\theta, t, \omega) g(\omega) d\theta d\omega$

Consistency

- Consistency requirement on deterministic mass influence

$$\bar{c}(\vartheta, t) = \int_{\Omega} \int_0^{2\pi} c^{\bullet}(\vartheta, \theta) p(\theta, t, \omega) g(\omega) d\theta d\omega$$

Recall:
$$c(\theta_i; \theta_{-i}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j \neq i} c^{\bullet}(\theta_i, \theta_j)$$

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
Bibliography

Q-learning



- Dynamics of i^{th} agent $\frac{d}{dt}x_i = a_i x_i + b_i u_i$
- i^{th} agent seeks to minimize

$$\eta_i = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \int_0^T e^{-\gamma s} ((x_i(s) - z(s))^2 + u_i^2(s)) \, ds$$

- Control $u_i = -k_x^i x_i - k_z^i z$



Control comparison



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Rational irrationality

The Prisoner's Dilemma is the obverse of Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand, in which the free market coördinates the behavior of self-seeking individuals to the benefit of all. Each businessman "intends only his own gain," Smith wrote in "The Wealth of Nations," "and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention." But in a market environment the individual pursuit of self-interest, however rational, can give way to collective disaster. The invisible hand becomes a fist.

John Cassidy, "Rational Irrationality: The real reason that capitalism is so crash-prone," The New Yorker, 2009



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